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ABSTRACT: One of urgent issues for sustainable development of the Chinese construction industry is 
argued to be developing capable specialty contractors in the downstream of supply chain. One valuable 
approach inspired from Japanese construction is argued to be building long-term relationship between 
General Contractor (GC) and a group of allied subcontractors (SCs). Then there comes a crucial issue as how 
to initiate and motivate the involved players to establish and maintain this cooperative business relationship, 
particularly under today’s extremely competitive and uncertain business environment.  
This study aims to explore the potential incentives of long term relationship. A tentative game-chain 
model was conducted on the psychological competition scenarios between GC and SC in the activity of 
resource allocating. In this model, maintaining a long term working relationship is interpreted as a chain of 
games, in which the former game will exert influence on the latter through the actions each player takes. As a 
result, the systematic equilibrium must be approached based on a holistic and dynamic thinking. The analytic 
results show that under an uncertain and dynamic situation in resource allocating, one-off game (as 
short-term work relationship) between GC and SC leads to the worst equilibrium, interpreted as cheating 
behaviors by both players. However, with the game repeating more times (forming a game-chain), the 
systematic equilibrium moves to honest behaviors by both players, with an increase in both utilities. It 
indicates that long-term relationship could provide with economic incentive for both players in their 
economic activities.  
In future study, this approach needs to be evaluated more comprehensively, particularly on its potential 
demerits. For example, if SCs are too much “locked in” vertical relationship with GC, it might easily lead to 
SCs’ inability to diversity and over-reliance. It again reveals the significance of more careful considerations 
on implementation practically. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
With regard to the industrial polices in the Chinese 
construction, up until now, those policies have 
mainly been oriented from the perspective of the 
industrial development, focusing on such issues as 
enhancing technical aspects of the industry, 
improving labor productivity, and increasing 
enterprises’ efficiency, and so on. This can be seen 
in the reform and restructure of management in 
construction enterprises, as well as the introduction 
of the market mechanism into recruitment practices 
in the 1980s; the reform of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and adjustments to the qualification 
requirements adopted in the late 1990s; and the 
promotion of mechanization and industrialization 
these years (Lu and Paul, 2001) . It is true to say that 
many good experiences have been accumulated with 
regard to the rapid development of construction 
industry in China. However, the negative effects on 
the potential on the job growth and employment 
situations have being occurred (Hu, 2002; Qian, 
2004). This can be noticed from the increasing 
difficulties in retention and recruitment of the 
construction labor force in recent China, with a 
major reason that most construction laborers have 
still being suffering from the poor working and 
living conditions (Cai, 2009). It reveals that a 
labor-oriented industrial development strategy needs 
to be taken into consideration as soon as possible for 
developing Chinese construction sustainably. It lies 
in not only sustaining a stable level of employment, 
but in helping create the conditions of business 
success as well. It is certainly a complicated and 
systematic task to be tackled carefully.  
 
One of the keys for developing Chinese 
construction sustainably is to truly understand the 
indispensable role of subcontractors in both 
construction production and employment 
improvement (An, 2012). And then, how to facilitate 
their continuous developments towards the capable 
specialty contractors in the downstream of supply 
chain becomes a crucial issue for both improving 
employment and production. Although the 
partnering under long term work relationship 
between General Contractor (GC) and a group of 
subcontractors (SCs) is argued to be an effective 
approach in many countries, however, under today’s 
competitive and insecure business environment, how 
to motivate and initiate this approach is still a 
difficult task to be tackled in both academic and 
practical fields.  
 
2. OBJECTIVE AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Partnering or strategic alliance, as one of the 
cooperative mechanisms, has been frequently 
considered in part of value chain (among client, 
designer, and general contractor) for integration in 
real practice, whereas subcontractors are often left 
out of the key alliance. This paper particularly 
focuses on the alliance between general contractors 
and subcontractors, and how to motivate the 
involved players to establish and maintain this 
partnering business manner under long term 
relationship with regard to competitiveness and 
insecurity of business environment. Aiming at 
exploring the potential incentives of promoting 
alliance between general contractors and 
subcontractors, a tentative game-chain model was 
conducted on the psychological competition 
scenarios between GC and SC in their major activity 
of resource allocation.  
 
3. BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
Under an unavoidable trend of subcontracting, 
despite of its merits and demerits, it has been agreed 
of the indispensability of subcontractors in 
construction production universally. Concerning the 
relationship between general contractors and 
subcontractors, many countries have already 
practiced alliance under long term relationship 
between contractors and their subcontractors 
formally and informally for many years. However, 
whether this approach could be beneficial to those 
involved parties are still under arguments. Some of 
their experiences have shown that alliances under 
long term relationships could contribute or benefit 
the construction industry. Hoban and Francis (2002) 
found that most subcontractors consistently work for 
the same contractors and 94% of subcontractors in 
Australia have worked with not more than three 
major contractors. Regarding the cooperation years, 
41% of commercial subcontractors have been found 
to maintain steady relationships with their general 
contractors for an average of 9.2 years (Costantino 
and Pietroforte, 2002). In Japan, this practice is more 
prevalence, regarding the fact that each giant general 
contractor has its exclusively allied subcontractors 
(kyoryokukai in Japanese). And it has been regarded 
as one crucial factor contributing to the highly 
specialized Japanese construction industry with 
abundant small scale subcontractors, who have high 
level of construction skills and techniques (Bennett 
et al., 1987). However, there are still arguments on 
partnering or alliances cannot provide those involved 
parties with any competitive advantage over other 
competitors. Take Australia for example, although 
strategic alliance has been promoted by government, 
it was demonstrated to be associated with a negative 
impact on business performance (Kwok, 1997). 
Regarding the practice, many scholars argue that 
long term relationship is prone to adoption by SCs 
just as a short-term response to the pressure from 
powerful clients or GCs, rather than a fundamental 
cultural change. Moreover, if it is not implemented 
properly, it could exert detrimental effects on SCs in 
turn. The real cultural change requires a true 
understanding of factors that dictate the basic 
interests of the parties involved (Bresnen and 
Marshall, 2000). Thus, to explore the benefits from 
long term relationship has practical significance, 
particularly for GC and SCs in their major activity in 
allocating resources.  
 
4. MODELLING AND ANALYSES 
 
Alliance of mutual trust between players can be seen 
as a successful cooperation game process. From the 
long-term view, only repeated games could reduce 
the happening of opportunistic behavior (to be 
dishonest), and increase the trust of partners when 
unpredictable events occur. Hence, a win-win supply 
chain alliance could be achieved. We will analyze 
the following simple game chain model to illustrate 
that continuous transactions under long term 
relationship will enhance the trust working culture. 
 
In this section, we will exemplify the behaviors 
of GC and SC through modeling the resource 
allocation in a series of games (forming a game 
chain). Intuitively, the behaviors of GC and SC are 
interrelated, and the behaviors in present work 
relation must have influence on the judgments in the 
possible next work relation between them. However, 
in practice, it seems not yet considered seriously by 
players. An empirical observation is that many 
downstream subcontractors in China seem only 
focus on gaining present (short-term) profits as far as 
they can, even with cheating behaviors that ruin the 
working culture within the construction supply chain. 
It lacks a strategic perspective on business 
development with regard to possible market shares 
by continuous transactions in the long run.   
 
4.1 Formulation of game-chain scenario between 
GC and SC 
We assume that GC and SC have no working relation 
before and it is also unknown that whether they 
would work together next time. Given that the 
contract price between client and GC is reasonable 
enough in each project so that GC does not have to 
worry about its payment by client. What GC should 
be concerned with is how to complete the work 
efficiently with SC’s cooperation in each project. 
Decisions influenced by this concern must be 
different from a short-term (one-off) or long-term 
perspective, which will be explained later. 
 
In the activity of resource allocation in a project, 
regarded as a game unit, SC tends to provide fewer 
resources, which is commonly acknowledged in 
practice by project manager from GC. In order to 
counteract this situation, GC would demand more 
resources than needed consequently. Intuitively, this 
would have a predictable result of damaging SC’s 
confidence in resource allocation, which will 
exacerbate the problems over time, and lead to 
lose-lose and non-trust working culture. That is to 
say, subcontracting in construction production is 
actually a series of games. In each round of game, 
GC (buyers) and SCs (sellers) seek to optimize their 
returns by demanding resources and allocating 
resources in projects.  
 
However, it must not be neglected that the result of 
former game would exert influence on the judgement 
or decision process in the latter game. So the 
continuous transactions actually could be interpreted 
as a chain of games in which the former game exerts 
influence on the latter based on the action each 
player takes. Consequently, any rational player 
should not only consider the immediate reward but 
also take the long-term benefit into consideration. In 
plain terms, today’s decision will influence 
tomorrow, and tomorrow’s decision will influence 
future as well. If you disregard the impacts on future 
and only take the interests of current stage into 
account, you actually do not make a wise decision 
seen from the long-term perspective. Thus, the 
systematic equilibrium of game chain must be 
approached from a holistic way of thinking.  
 
Then we form the following game chain in a general 
way (only two rounds of games will be analyzed 
here) (see figure 1), in which I1 denotes the influence 
on the 2nd round game, which is exerted by the 
equilibrium E1 of the 1st round game. Here E denotes 
the systematic equilibrium of game chain, the result 
from a holistic point of view by both rational players. 
The utility of game unit i is denotes as ui (i=1,2).  
 
4.2 Analyses on one-off game  
To find the systematic equilibrium, one-off game 
will be analyzed firstly. One-off game here 
exemplifies the scenario that both players only 
concern short-term benefit in a one-off work relation, 
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Figure 1 A two-unit game-chain of GC and SC in the 
activities of resource allocation 
 
4.2.1 Moves of players 
In each round of game, two players make “moves” 
one after the other through the repeated cycles of the 
game. To be detailed, GC will set the work amount 
(Wdemanded) that is to be performed by SC in each 
period based on the work plan (Wplanned). In response, 
a rational SC will evaluate the amount of work 
demanded will actually become available (Wavailable), 
and then take actions to supply the proper amount of 
resources (Rprovided). Since the actions are taken 
sequentially, this process turns out to be a series of 
dynamic games. What is needed to stress here is that 
both GC and SC have imperfect knowledge about 
the outcome in terms of the work amount that will 
actually be completed until it happens.  
 
4.2.2 Impacts of work plan reliability q 
This one-off game in each round between GC and 
SC is a dynamic game with incomplete information. 
In this game, the project manager from GC must take 
an action with imperfect knowledge of the actual 
work amount that is made available. Similarly, the 
subcontractor also has imperfect knowledge about 
whether the project manager from GC has demanded 
more, exact or fewer resources than necessary. In a 
word, the actions set of GC and SC is supposed to be 
greatly influenced by the degree of their perceptions 
on the actually available work amount, regarded as 
the work plan reliability denoted here as q . It must 
be known that the work plans are not always 
necessarily reliable. In other words, it is often 
unknown with uncertainty Pr(q) at the beginning of 
each period, meaning that the actual value of q occurs 
with uncertainty Pr(q) in practice.  
 
4.2.3 Harsanyi transformation with information set 
Information set is used here to explore the impact of 
plan reliability on the expected behaviors of GC and 
SC with regard to plan reliability. It will then make it 
possible to model the scenario in which each player 
either knows or does not know the variable value of 
‘nature’ (N), in this case the value of q, which 
measures the amount of work that will actually 
become available. In this scenario, the incomplete 
game between GC and SC will then be converted 
into two stages of dynamic games via Harsanyi 
transformation (see figure 2). 
 
GC’s possible actions are detailed at the second 
level by d, which represents the ratio of the work 
demanded to the work that GC estimates will 
actually become available. Here, the value of d, will 
be modeled by discrete values: demand for less work 
amount than estimated (d=0.9), exactly the amount 
estimated (k=1), and more than estimated (d=1.1). In 
response to GC’s demand, SC can select the amount 
of resources to be allocated according to the amount 
required for the work demanded. Here, k represents 
the radio of resources supplied to those demanded 
(k=0.9), exactly the amount required (k=1), or more 
than demanded (k=1.1). 
0.9k 
1.1q 1q 

































Figure 2 The one-off game between GC and SC by 
Harsanyi transformation 
 
4.2.4 Pay-off matrix and equilibrium 
Given the unit price for the work set (U) in the 
subcontract, the unit costs of materials (CM), and the 
cost of resources per units of work planned (CS), the 
payoff matrix of this one-off game between GC and 
SC under the information sets of plan reliability is 
shown in Table 1 (An, 2012). The equilibrium of this 
one-off game is (1.1, 0.9), which means that in the 
one-off game (a short-term work relation), GC is 
likely to demand more resources, and SC is prone to 
supply with fewer resources eventually. It is a 
frustrating result, since both of players have not 
achieved their optimum utilities, and also the 
collective optimum utility. 
                                                        
Table 1 Payoff matrix of the one-off game between GC and SC 
   SC 
GC 
0.9 1.0 1.1 
0.9 (0.81,0.81( ) 0.9 )M SU C C   (0.9,0.9( ) )M SU C C   (0.963, 0.963( ) 1.1 )M SU C C   
1.0 (0.9,0.9( ) 0.9 ))M SU C C   (0.97, 0.97( ) )M SU C C   (0.98,0.98( ) 1.1 )M SU C C   
1.1 (0.963,0.963( ) 0.9 )M SU C C   (0.98,0.98( ) )M SU C C   (0.98,0.98( ) 1.1 )M SU C C   
 
4.3 Analyses on the two-unit game-chain 
Regarding that the happening possibility of next 
work relation is passively perceived in the previous 
one-off game, both players are only interested in the 
present or immediate benefits. However, with the 
game repeating many times, the result may move 
towards different one. Under long term relationship 
with continuous transactions, intuitively, players are 
likely to give up the opportunistic behaviors of 
cheating each other, and choose a different strategy 
to pursue for overall benefits.  
 
Let’s go back to the two-unit game-chain shown 
in figure 1. Both players actually know how their 
decisions in the former game will influence the 
action in the latter one. As a result, what they 
concern is not only the benefit at present, but the 
overall benefits of all possible transactions between 
them. A rational player would follow the principle 
of tit-for-tat, meaning that if both players choose to 
cooperate in the first round of the game, the 
subsequent round will repeat with the same 
strategy; if the player chooses to cheat, the other 
will choose to cheat in the subsequent game as well. 
Therefore, in this gaming process, a rational player 
is supposed to take into account of the fact that the 
“partner” may retaliate in the subsequent round.  
 
To approach to the systematic equilibrium of 
this game chain, analyses are simply divided into 
two parts with regard to different types of 
subcontracting market: 
Market Type I: demand exceeding supply 
Market Type II: supply exceeding demand 
Then, the influences of the former game on the 
latter one are interpreted in the table 2 and table 3, 
followed with pay-off matrixes as the table 4 and 
table 5 respectively. Here, δi (i=1,2,3) denotes the 
discount factor in the 2nd round game (0<δi<1). The 
value of δ1 is the smallest, because the cheat 
behaviors by both will lead to the worst result in the 
2nd game. Cj (j=1,2) denotes the cost of participating 
in another work relation as a result of cheating 
behavior in the former work relation. 
 
Table 2 Interpretations of influences under market I 
Actions (R1) Influences (I1) Following Actions (R2) 
(0.9,0.9) Dishonest SC (1.1,0.9) with δ1 
(0.9,1.0) Trustful SC (1.0,1.0) 
(0.9,1.1) Negotiation (1.0,1.0) 
(1.0,0.9) Dishonest SC (1.1,0.9) with δ1 
(1.0,1.0) Both trustful (1.0,1.0) 
(1.0,1.1) Trustful GC (1.0, 1.0) 
(1.1,0.9) Both 
dishonest  
(1.1,0.9) with δ1, C1 
(1.1,1.0) Dishonest GC (1.0,0.9) with δ2, C1 
(1.1,1.1) Dishonest GC (1.0,0.9) with δ2, C1 
 
Table 3 Interpretations of influence under market II 
Actions (R1) Influences (I1) Following Actions (R2) 
(0.9,0.9) Dishonest SC (1.1, 1.0) with δ3, C2  
(0.9,1.0) Trustful SC (1.0,1.0)  
(0.9,1.1) Negotiation (1.0,1.0) 
(1.0, 0.9) Dishonest SC (1.1, 1.0) with δ3, C2 
(1.0,1.0) Both trustful (1.0,1.0) 
(1.0,1.1) Trustful GC (1.0,1.0) 
(1.1,0.9) Both 
dishonest  
(1.1,0.9) with δ1, C2 
(1.1,1.0) Dishonest GC (1.1,0.9) with δ1 
(1.1,1.1) Dishonest GC (1.1,0.9) with δ1 
 
As can be seen from table 4, in the market with 
demand exceeding supply, the game equilibrium 
must lie in the row of GC=1.0, given the value of 
C1 is large sufficiently, and a small discount factor 
δ1. It means that a rational GC should choose to be 
honest. And consequently a rational SC would like 
to be of integrity as well. Hence, through repeating 
game (interpreted as continuous transactions under 
long term relationship), the equilibrium moves to 
(1.0, 1.0). Similarly, seen from table 5, in the 
market with supply exceeding demand, a rational 
SC will not choose k=0.9, given a sufficiently large 
value of C2. Considering the discount factor of δ1, 
we could easily find the equilibrium of this game is 
(1.0, 1.0). The analytic results tell that taking the 
total utilities of two round games into account, GC 
and SC will choose to be honest at the beginning. 
Thus, it could be concluded that long term 
relationship could provide with economic incentive 
to bring a win-win work relations and further 




The analytic results of model show that under an 
uncertain and dynamic situation in resource 
allocation, one-off game (as short-term work 
relation) between GC and SC leads to the worst 
equilibrium, interpreted as cheating behaviors by 
both players. However, with the game repeating 
more times (forming a game-chain), the equilibrium 
moves towards honest behaviors by both players. It 
indicates that long-term relationship could provide 
with economic incentive for both players in their 
economic activities, which could promote trustful 
working culture in the long run. However, this 
approach still needs to be evaluated more 
comprehensively, particularly on its potential 
demerits. For example, if SCs are too much “locked 
in” vertical relationship with GC, it might easily 
lead to SCs’ inability to diversity and over-reliance. 
It again reveals the significance of careful 
considerations on practical implementation. 
    
Table 4 Pay-off matrix of two-unit game-chain under market type I 
   SC 
GC 
0.9 1.0 1.1 
0.9 
(0.81,0.81( ) 0.9 )M SU C C   
+δ1 (0.963,0.963( ) 0.9 )M SU C C   
(0.9,0.9( ) )M SU C C   
+ (0.97, 0.97( ) )M SU C C   
(0.963, 0.963( ) 1.1 )M SU C C   
+ (0.97, 0.97( ) )M SU C C   
1.0 
(0.9, 0.9( ) 0.9 ))M SU C C   
+δ1 (0.963,0.963( ) 0.9 )M SU C C   
(0.97, 0.97( ) )M SU C C   
+ (0.97, 0.97( ) )M SU C C   
(0.98,0.98( ) 1.1 )M SU C C   
+ (0.97, 0.97( ) )M SU C C   
1.1 
(0.963,0.963( ) 0.9 )M SU C C   
+δ1 (0.963,0.963( ) 0.9 )M SU C C   
-(C1,0)   
(0.98,0.98( ) )M SU C C   
+δ2 (0.963,0.963( ) 0.9 )M SU C C   
-(C1,0) 
(0.98,0.98( ) 1.1 )M SU C C   
+δ2 (0.963,0.963( ) 0.9 )M SU C C   
-(C1,0) 
 
Table 5 Pay-off matrix of two-unit game-chain under market type II 
   SC 
GC 
0.9 1.0 1.1 
0.9 
(0.81,0.81( ) 0.9 )M SU C C   
+δ3 (0.98,0.98( ) )M SU C C   
-(0,C2) 
(0.9,0.9( ) )M SU C C   
+ (0.97, 0.97( ) )M SU C C   
(0.963, 0.963( ) 1.1 )M SU C C   
+ (0.97, 0.97( ) )M SU C C   
1.0 
(0.9, 0.9( ) 0.9 ))M SU C C   
+δ3 (0.98,0.98( ) )M SU C C   
-(0,C2) 
(0.97, 0.97( ) )M SU C C   
+ (0.97, 0.97( ) )M SU C C   
(0.98,0.98( ) 1.1 )M SU C C   
+ (0.98,0.98( ) )M SU C C   
1.1 
(0.963,0.963( ) 0.9 )M SU C C   
+δ1 (0.963,0.963( ) 0.9 )M SU C C   
-(0,C2) 
(0.98,0.98( ) )M SU C C   
+δ1 (0.963,0.963( ) 0.9 )M SU C C   
(0.98,0.98( ) 1.1 )M SU C C   
+δ1 (0.963,0.963( ) 0.9 )M SU C C   
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